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wise, the doctrine will not apply if a deed purports to convey or transfer a possibility of acquiring property; but the
transfer may be enforced as a contract to convey by the
transferee and all persons claiming through him, provided
a present consideration had been paid. 7
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Recent Decisions
Adverse Possession - Grantor Remaining In Possession
By Mistake Of Boundary Location Is Not Hostile. Vlachos
v. Witherow, 118 A. 2d 174 (Pa. 1955). In an ejectment
action, defendants claimed title by adverse possession. The
common owner of both parcels involved conveyed one to his
daughter (predecessor in title to plaintiffs) in 1927, but remained in possession of that portion adjoining the land he
retained and separated from the rest of the conveyed land
by a fence. He was not aware at the time that he had conveyed any land on his side of the fence. In 1931 he devised
to his son for life, remainder to his son's children (defendants herein), both the land to which he held title and the
portion mistakenly included in the deed to his daughter, of
which he retained possession. The daughter died in 1936 and
it was not until 1948 that anyone discovered that she had
been deeded the disputed portion, the possession of which
by father, son, and defendants was continuous, actual, and
exclusive until the filing of ejectment in 1952. On appeal
from a verdict directed for plaintiffs, held, affirmed. Hostility of possession is an essential element to adverse possession, and when the area of actual possession of the title
holder is restricted by a mistaken belief as to the location
of the boundary, and the possession of the adverse party is
likewise extended as a result of the same mistake, that
hostility is abent. Where the grantor continues in possession, his possession is considered that of the grantee until
some unequivocally hostile act occurs which, being brought
home to the grantee, will support an adverse claim. Here,
the devise of the disputed portion to the son and defendants
was not such an act.
While the Court of Appeals has never decided a case
in which the claim of adverse possession depended upon
17

Keys v. Keys, 8upra, n. 15.
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the grantor's holding adversely to the grantee by continuing his possession, a series of recent cases has decided that
a mistake as to the location of the boundary with reference
to which the adverse party has taken possession of the disputed land and the failure of the adverse party to claim
under color of title will not keep the statute of limitations
from running against the title holder, at least where "the
limits of the [adverse] occupation [are] fixed with the intention of claiming them as the boundary line.. ." Tamburo
v. Miller, 203 Md. 329, 336, 100 A. 2d 818 (1953). See also
Hub Bel Air, Inc. v. Hirsch, 203 Md. 637, 102 A. 2d 550
(1954); Ervin v. Brown, 204 Md. 136, 102 A. 2d 806 (1954);
Ridgely v. Lewis, 204 Md. 563, 105 A. 2d 212 (1954). Bishop
v. Stackus, 206 Md. 493, 112 A. 2d 472 (1955) applied the
Tamburo rule in the absence of clearly defined boundaries,
though the limits of adverse user were reasonably easy to
ascertain. As to the basic inapplicability of the mistake
element in adverse possession cases, see 4 TIFFANY, REAL
PRoPERTY

(3d ed., 1939), Sec. 1159.

Animals-Hammering Dog's Head With Fists Is "Abuse"
Under Statute Fixing Liability Of Dog Owners. Schonwald
v. Tapp, 118 A. 2d 302 (Conn. 1955). In trying to break up
a fight between her dog and that of defendant, plaintiff
belabored defendant's dog about the head with her fists.
She was bitten. On appeal from judgment in favor of defendant, held, affirmed. Passing over the trial judge's finding
that, in voluntarily intervening in a dog fight, plaintiff
assumed the risk, under the statute permitting one injured
by a dog to recover damages from the owner, except where
the injured was "teasing, tormenting, or abusing such dog",
plaintiff's action was clearly an abuse barring recovery.
Maryland dog owners are not burdened by such comprehensive liability. The state retains the common law rule
that, in absence of the owner's knowledge of the animal's
disposition to injure, "every dog is entitled to one bite",
and, even if that bite has already been taken, the injured
may be barred from recovery by contributory negligence
short of "abuse" or assumption of the risk. See generally
May Co. v. Drury, 160 Md. 143, 153 A. 61 (1931).
Bailments - Lessee Of Chattel Who Warrants Return
In Good Condition Is Insurer Thereof. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 286 P. 2d 107 (Wash.
1955). Defendant leased an earth moving machine from
plaintiff's insured by a lease-purchase option contract under
which he warranted, if he failed to purchase, to return the
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machine in good mechanical condition, except for reasonable wear and tear. The machine was destroyed by fire
without fault of defendant and the lessor recovered his loss
from plaintiff-insurer, who brought this action as assignee
of the contract seeking recovery on the warranty. On appeal from judgment for plaintiff, held (5-4), affirmed. The
warranty extended defendant's liability beyond that of
common law bailment and constituted him an insurer of
the machine for its full value. Weaver, J., among others,
dissented, saying that a bailee may, by contract, make himself an insurer, but the warranty to return in good condition is merely declarative of the common law liability,
which assumes the continued existence of the chattel and
does not make a bailee liable when, through no fault of his
own, return is impossible.
See Annotation, 150 A. L. R. 269-305, 277, which points
out the close division of courts on the question of whether
a promise to return "in good condition" amounts to a waiver
of the defense of impossibility of performance and thus constitutes the bailee an insurer.
Criminal Law - Theft Of Money From A Corpse By
Undertaker's Servant Is Larceny And Not Embezzlement.
Edwards v. State, 286 S. W. 2d 157 (Tex. Cr. App. 1955).
Defendant, employed by a funeral home as an embalmer,
found $580 in a cloth container pinned to the clothing of a
corpse on which he was working. He took the money. On
appeal from a conviction for felony theft, held, affirmed.
The money on the body did not belong to the funeral home,
and defendant's act, as its employee, of converting the
money to his own use was not an embezzlement from his
employer. The funeral home's taking custody of the corpse
for embalming did not "constitute a contract to borrow or
hire the body for its own use and benefit and is therefore
not a bailment" (159).
There appear to be no Maryland cases on this point.
Firearms - Statutory Provision For Forfeiture Of Arms
Upon Criminal Conviction Inapplicable To Civil Convictions For Violation Of The Game Laws. Sawran v. Lennon, 118 A. 2d 10 (N. J. 1955). Upon pleading guilty to hunting deer out of season, illegal possession of a deer, and possession of an illegal deer hunting missle, plaintiffs were
convicted and fined. Their guns were confiscated, and this
action was brought against the sheriff and game warden to
recover same. On appeal from judgment for plaintiffs, held,
affirmed. The statutory forfeiture provision applies to
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criminal proceedings, but proceedings under the fish and
game laws are summary suits for the imposition of penalties
for mere civil, as distinct from criminal, wrongs. "The
Legislature intended to cover only criminally unlawful acts,
and not acts which were less than criminal or which carried
only pecuniary penalties."
The Maryland Legislature has left no doubt that it intends a sweeping forfeiture of firearms for any violation of
the deer hunting laws. Md. Code (1955 Supp.) Art. 66C,
Sec. 195(h). Duck hunters are subject to section 150(a),
which provides for confiscation of guns "which cannot be
habitually raised and fired from the shoulder", or guns
larger than ten gauge, or rifles "found in the vicinity of
areas of wildfowl". Evidently section 195(h) would apply
to shotguns loaded with buckshot rather than a rifled slug,
while section 150(a) would not apply to "unplugged" shotguns (those capable of firing more than three shots without reloading), which are unlawful hunting pieces under
that section. The Maryland situation seems to be not one
of too little confiscatory power under the game laws but
perhaps of too much. Aside from the strictness as to deer
violators, section 121(b) (1951 Code) gives game wardens
powers of seizure of ". . . any.., device being used unlawfully so found in possession in violation of the law.. ." and
provides that such ". . . shall be disposed of by the Game
Warden as he may deem advisable for the best interests of
the State". This might be understood to apply to such situations as posed in section 131(g) (1955 Supp.) making it
unlawful to carry a loaded gun in a car, but providing for
no forfeiture. The federal migratory bird laws illegalize
certain fowling pieces, but provide for no forfeiture. 16
U. S. C. A. (1941), Secs. 704, (sec. 6.3, p. 181, 1955 Supp.), 707.
Garnishment - Service Upon Agent Of Garnishee Voids
The Cause For Want Of Jurisdiction. Hollywood Credit
Clothing Co. v. Hundley, 118 A. 2d 515 (D. C. Mun. App.
1955). Plaintiff directed a garnishment against a tire dealer,
instructing the marshal to serve the dealer's bookkeeper as
agent. The bookkeeper filed an answer that nothing was
due the judgment defendant, and plaintiff caused the issue
of a subpoena directing the bookkeeper to appear for oral
examination and to bring certain documents. A motion to
quash was granted. On appeal, held, affirmed. There was
no error, and the entire proceeding could have been declared a nullity. Garnishment is a proceeding in personam,
not in rem, and, since there is nothing in the District Code

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

permitting constructive service, only actual service on the
person of the garnishee will give jurisdiction.
To the same effect, as regards Art. 9, Sec. 11 of the Maryland Code (1951), see Wilmer v. Epstein, 116 Md. 140, 81 A.
379 (1911). For a survey of Maryland attachment law, see
Rhynhart, Attachments in the People's Court of Baltimore
City, 14 Md. L. Rev. 235, 258 (1954).
Motor Vehicles - Pedestrian Crossing Intersection With
Light Must Exercise Continuing Due Care. Poulos v. Cassara, 118 A. 2d 130 (Pa. 1955). Plaintiff, while crossing an
intersection with a green light in his favor, was struck by
an automobile, driven by defendant, which was proceeding
through the intersection. Judgment was entered on a verdict for defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. There was no
error in instructing the jury that, if plaintiff did not continue to exercise vigilance while crossing, he was contributorily negligent. A pedestrian cannot cross a street wholly
in reliance upon the green light which favors him, for that
light gives him only a permissive license to cross. "He must
look, keep looking, as he crosses."
The rights of motorists and pedestrians, one against the
other, are apportioned by statute. Md. Code (1951), Art.
66'/2, Sec. 157 (at intersections regulated by traffic lights),
201 (at unregulated intersections and between intersections). As to the historical confusion of trying to determine
what degree of care shall be required of preferred and unpreferred parties in the various statutory situations, see
Due and Bishop, Motorists and Pedestrians- A Study of
the Judicial Process In Relation to the Statutory Right of
Way Law in Maryland, 11 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1950); State v.
Belle Isle Cab Co., 194 Md. 550, 71 A. 2d 435 (1950), noted in
13 Md. L. Rev. 63 (1953). A pedestrian crossing an unregulated intersection, though "favored" by the statute, must
exercise due care. Chasanow v. Smouse, 168 Md. 629, 178
A. 846 (1935). A pedestrian crossing against a light or
crossing between intersections, though "disfavored" by the
statutes, is held only to the exercise of due care. Weissman
v. Hokamp, 171 Md. 197, 188 A. 923, 189 A. 813 (1937). A
motorist favored by a green light cannot "blindly" enter
an intersection. Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 196 Md. 118,
75 A. 2d 97 (1950), noted in 13 Md. L. Rev. 350 (1953).
This is probably true as to pedestrians, since "blindly"
suggests some sort of reckless conduct beyond mere negligence. Though the Court of Appeals has not decided a case
on all fours with the present one, there is at least some sug-
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gestion that the statutory "right of way" given a pedestrian
crossing with a green light may relieve him of the headswivelling duties required of him in other crossing situations. In Caryl v. Baltimore Transit Co., 190 Md. 162, 170,
58 A. 2d 239 (1948), it was said that a pedestrian in such
situation is not bound to anticipate that a streetcar would
fail to respect such "right of way", and in Baltimore Transit
Co. v. Castranda,194 Md. 421, 71 A. 2d 442 (1950), it was
held not error to refuse an instruction that, if a pedestrian
failed to look for approaching vehicles, where a look would
have appraised him of their approach, that failure would
constitute contributory negligence even if the light favored
the pedestrian. It was said at page 435 that "The judge
properly refused to give that instruction, because it ignored
the testimony that [plaintiff 1was crossing the street in the
crosswalk and that the light was green when he started
across."
Real Estate Agents - Licensing Requirement Of Corporate Bond Not Unconstitutional. Cyphers v. Allyn, 118
A. 2d 318 (Conn. 1955). Plaintiff real estate broker brought
this action for a declaratory judgment that the portion of
an act of 1953 requiring the posting of a corporate surety
bond as a prerequisite to mandatory licensing of realtors
by the insurance commissioner was unconstitutional as (1)
an illegal delegation of power to a corporation whose bonding whim is beyond the reach of the law and capable of
denying him the right to carry on his business, and (2) a
provision amounting to an unreasonable and arbitrary
licensing standard. On certification, held, judgment for
defendant. The Legislature, in the exercise of its police
power, might reasonably believe that corporate surety
bonds, being in the nature of insurance contracts, will afford
the public greater protection than that offered by private
surety bonds, and, in view of the competition between bonding companies for business, there is no reason to believe a
bond will be refused "in a worthy case".
The same requirement in Maryland has never had its
constitutionality challenged. Md. Code (1955 Supp.), Art.
56, Sec. 224(b).
Sales - Where Written Contract Contains Disclaimer
Of Warranty, Parol Evidence Rule Bars Evidence Of Implied Warranty Of Quality. Gagnon v. Speback, 118 A. 2d
744 (Pa.1955). Seller had 18,000 bushels of potatoes stored
twelve feet deep in his warehouse. Buyer looked at the
pile, agreed to take them "as is", rather than pay seller for
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grade sorting. He paid $15,000 in cash and executed a
$15,000 judgment note, receiving a bill of sale stating that
seller made no warranty of quantity or quality. Seller
knew, but buyer did not, that the potatoes had been exposed
to frost, snow, and rain in the field. When buyer began hauling the potatoes away, he discovered that the under layers
were in an advanced stage of rot; most of the potatoes were
unfit even for consumption by cattle. After seller got judgment on the note, buyer moved for a rule to show cause why
it should not be opened. On appeal from discharge of the
rule, held, affirmed. The action is brought upon the written
contract expressed in the bill of sale; since there is no evidence of fraud or mistake as to the disclaimer of warranty
therein, and since buyer had an opportunity to inspect the
potatoes and determine their merchantability, buyer cannot
be permitted to set up an implied warranty of quality.
Musmanno, J., dissented: Buyer should be permitted to
present to a jury the question of whether seller deceived
him in selling potatoes he knew to have been exposed to
rot-producing weather so as to render them unusable as
food, because: (1) inspection was impossible; (2) this was
a bulk sale by sample; under the Sales Act there is an implied warranty that the bulk will correspond to the quality
of the sample and that the bulk will be free of any defect
rendering it unmarketable which cannot be discovered by
reasonable inspection of the sample; (3) these warranties
arise by operation of law upon the circumstances of the sale,
are independent of the written contract and not subject to
the parol evidence rule; no disavowal of warranty can permit one to sell something other than that which he contracted to sell, and here the rot was so advanced that what
was actually sold "had lost all standing as potatoes".
While the Court of Appeals has apparently not decided
what effect the parol evidence rule has on a dealer's implied
warranty of quality, Buchananv. Dugan, 82 A. 2d 911 (D. C.
Mun. App. 1951), ruled that such warranties arise independently of the contract, but that this does not affect the
right of the parties to exclude any implied warranty by a
merger clause. See 1 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed., 1948),
Sec. 239. As to bulk sales by sample, see Md. Code (1951),
Art. 83, Sec. 34; Gunther v. Atwell, 19 Md. 157 (1862). That,
in order for an implied warranty of fitness to arise, buyer
must not have examined the goods where such examination
should have revealed the defect, see ibid, Sec. 33. For the
most important Maryland cases on implied warranties of
fitness, see Note, 7 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1942). There is consider-
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able juridical disagreement as to what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to inspect, what effect that opportunity
has on buyer's rights for breach of implied warranty, and
what constitutes a sale by sample when the goods are in
bulk. See Note, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 941 (1939). Aside from
the parol evidence question, the facts of this case present
a very close series of problems as to whether buyer had an
opportunity to inspect, whether this was a sale by sample
of bulk, and whether there was not a mutual mistake in that
the subject matter of the contract was materially different
from that received.
Workmen's Compensation - Employer Must Contribute
To Unemployment Fund For Home Workers Not Engaged
In Independently Established Trade. Weiss-Lawrence, Inc.
v. Riley, 118 A. 2d 731 (N. H. 1955). Petitioner shoe manufacturing company sought declaratory judgment against
Commissioner of Labor to establish its non-liability for unemployment compensation contributions for certain "home
workers" who were trained by petitioner in the lacing and
beading of moccasins, supplied by it with materials, and
paid weekly on a piece-work basis, the workers being under
no obligation to accept or continue work but agreeing to
finish accepted work in compliance with petitioner's standards. Upon findings of the trial court, held, judgment for
respondent. The statute is not a mere codification of common law distinctions between employees and independent
contractors, for the purpose of those distinctions was to
determine the tort liability of masters, while the statute
has the broader aim of distributing and easing the burden
of unemployment of those attached to the labor market.
Under the statute, petitioner had the burden of proving the
home workers were "customarily engaged in an independently established trade"; its failure to meet the burden is
fatal to its cause.
Md. Code (1951), Art. 95A, Sec. 19(g) (6) (C), requires
that the workers be engaged in an "independently established trade" in order for the employer to avoid contribution.

